Delayed Reaction: The CRTC and the Future of the Canadian Television Fund

I'm trying to catch up on the flurry of policy activity over the last little while, as well as taking care of some writing responsibilities. And as most academics will note, blogging comes at the end. At this rate, I'll get to the Bill c-61 business some time in 2012 (but Michael Geist has got it all covered anyway). Then again, timeliness isn't exactly the hallmark of this little piece of real estate here in cyberspace.

So, on to the business at hand:

Last month saw the release of the CRTC’s recommendations for the future of the Canadian Television Fund to the Minister of Canadian Heritage. The big attention-grabber was the suggestion to split the fund into two, so that the private sector portion of the fund would be administered largely by the private sector to make “commercially-oriented” programs. The other chunk of money, which comes from the Department of Canadian Heritage, would be administered by a separate board and oriented towards programs that achieve the objectives of the Broadcasting Act and would be aired on the CBC and non-profit broadcasters.

While the report is only a set of recommendations, and it is ultimately up to the Heritage minister to make the final decision on how the CTF should be administered, it represents an unbelievably misguided document. Here's why:

1. The report makes a mockery of the public consultation process: If the CRTC knew in advance that it was going to adopt the Task Force recommendations made earlier this year, why was a public consultation necessary?

2. It accepts, without any hint of criticism or reflection, the “crisis” rhetoric espoused by Canadian broadcasters, a claim made with dubious evidence.

3. The report effectively accepts the arguments made by Shaw and Quebecor, even if it didn't accept their solutions to the problem. In the process, it missed a a golden opportunity to put BDU’s in their place. Instead of having each BDU contribute to a federally administered fund, why not have each company set up its own fund, which it can administer in any way it wishes, provided that it meets requirements laid out by the CRTC? This would encourage a diversity of productions (since each company would use it to develop programming for its own purposes, rather than for the collective good of each other). Commissioner Michel Morin is right when, in his dissenting report, he wrote that the Quebecor fund model should have earned a trial period to see how it worked. The intention should be to move the carefully managed private sector away from moments of collusion. Having competitive entities jointly administrating a “commercial” stream of money to stimulate production is evidence is not a recipe for making good programming, its a recipe for making "content" to fill the airwaves. It is, by almost any measure, totally ridiculous.

4. By tying money from the Heritage Department for “cultural” programming, it further contributes to a reshuffling of the CBC so that it inches ever closer to zones in which political meddling can be more direct. It also serves as a slap on the CBC’s wrists for its attempts to make popular programming, a move that has been largely awkward, poorly conceived, and, I hate to say it, would ultimately lead to its marginalization. Sure, the Conservative government, the CRTC, and the private broadcasters have a lot to do with what has happened to the state of public broadcasting in this country. But do not be led astray here – the CBC has been equally if not more complicit to its own demise.

5. With its introduction of the "hit factor", the CRTC has assisted in turining a discussion around access into a discussion around ratings and scheduling. In spite of its populist rhetoric, this move threatens to result in greater regulation over the content of Canadian television.

6. With its recommendation that new funding should be directed to support new media content, the report tips the CRTC’s hand as to how it is going to regulate the activities of the BDU’s and others online by showing that they on the verge of applying logics drawn from other sectors to a new media environment they clearly do not understand.

7. By threatening to intervene on negotiations between broadcasters and producers on how to deal with new media residuals, the CRTC now threatens to expand, not contract, its regulatory reach by acting ast the de facto mediator for two parties for which it jointly represents.

8. The report further insults Canadian audiences and creators by asking to conceive of television in a way which is completely foreign to their own enjoyable experiences of the medium, argues for greater regulation of the scheduling of programming, and has the chutzpah to suggest that one can easily mandate to make television shows with “popular appeal”.

9. It has absolutely nothing to do with television as a media form, as a creative venture, as a form of leisure, or as a cultural form. This explains why so few Canadians take the opportunity to appear before the Commission or to write in. It has very little to do with them in the first place.

10. While it’s probably not the CRTC’s place to do so, the report could have at least opened the door for the most poignant statement of all: That it is time to reconsider the principles underlying Canada’s Broadcasting Act. This kind of discussion would not result in the dissolution of the CRTC but would call for a reshuffling of its regulatory purview away from propping up the country's broadcasting sector based on a perception of scarcity, but one which recognizes the need of a broadcasting regulator to facilitate a culture of access and innovation for a world of media abundance. It did no such thing, choosing instead to follow the path of least resistance. In the process, rather than reflecting a progressive vision towards the regulation of communication, the report demonstrated that the commission continues to look sideways for inspiration.